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Abstract
We study the e¤ect of civil conict on social capital, focusing on the experience of Uganda
during the last decade. Using individual and county-level data, we document causal e¤ects on
trust and ethnic identity of an exogenous outburst of ethnic conicts in 2002-04. We exploit two
waves of survey data from Afrobarometer 2000 and 2008, including information on socioeconomic
characteristics at the individual level, and geo-referenced measures of ghting events from ACLED.
Our identication strategy exploits variations in the intensity of ghting both in the spatial and
cross-ethnic dimensions. We nd that more intense ghting decreases generalized trust and increases
ethnic identity. The e¤ects are quantitatively large and robust to a number of control variables,
alternative measures of violence, and di¤erent statistical techniques involving ethnic and county
xed e¤ects and instrumental variables. We also document that the post-war e¤ects of ethnic
violence depend on the ethnic fractionalization. Fighting has a negative e¤ect on the economic
situation in highly fractionalized counties, but has no e¤ect in less fractionalized counties. Our
ndings are consistent with the existence of a self-reinforcing process between conicts and ethnic
cleavages.
JEL Classication: D74, O12, Z1.
Keywords: Conict, Trust, Ethnic Fighting, Uganda, Social Capital, Identity.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates from an empirical perspective the e¤ect of civil conict on social capital,
focusing on the experience of Uganda during the last decade. Civil conicts have persistent devastating
e¤ects on economic development (DeRouen and Bercovitch 2008, Collier and Hoe­ er 2004, Collier,
Hoe­ er and Rohner 2009, Quinn, Mason and Gurses 2007, and Walter 2004). Their legacy involves
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more than physical and human capital destruction. The aftermaths of civil conicts are often plagued
by the breakdown of civic and economic cooperation within society.
We are motivated by our previous theoretical work (Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti 2011), where
we argue that war leads to a collapse of trust and social capital which in turn carries the seeds
of further conicts. In our theory, trade is the opportunity cost of war, and war shocks destroy
social capital by inducing beliefs that the other ethnic group is not predisposed to peaceful trade.
While our theory is consistent with a number of casual observations (e.g., inter-ethnic trade between
Hindu and Muslim communities in India, see Jha 2008), there are instances in which wars appear
to cement rather than destroy cooperation. Historically, wars promoted nation building in Europe
(Tilly 1975), while the aftermath of World War II in Western Europe was characterized by strong
institutional development involving social cooperation, renewed national identity and sustained high
economic growth (Eichengreen 2008). While the post-war dynamics of international conicts are
arguably di¤erent from those of civil wars, Bellows and Miguel (2009) also report evidence of positive
social capital developments in Sierra Leone after the devastating civil conict of 1991-2002.1 The goal
of this paper is to contribute to address two questions: First, is there evidence of causal e¤ects of war
on inter-ethnic trust? Second, how do such e¤ects di¤er across di¤erent dimensions of trust and social
capital?
We document causal e¤ects of ethnic conict on trust and ethnic identity using individual, county-
and district-level data from Uganda. Uganda is a natural environment for such a micro-study. It is an
ethnic mosaic consisting of at least 52 groups. Ethnic (or ethnic-related) conicts have been pervasive
in this country at least since independence in 1962. The history of military coups and violent regime
changes is associated with the hegemony of di¤erent ethnic groups, the main divide being that between
the Nilotic people of the North, and the Bantu people of the South. Since 1985, Uganda has been
ruled by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni, who participated rst
in the demise of Idi Amin Dada, and then in the rebellion against Amins successor (and former
predecessor), Milton Obote. Although generally viewed as non sectarian, Musevenis government
has its main constituency in the Bantu-dominated South, while it has faced resilient opposition and
armed rebellion in the North of the country, especially in the "Acholiland" region. The Acholi people,
traditionally the warrior elite of Uganda, had been loyal to Obote and have remained by-and-large
alienated from the NMR. The main military challenge against the government has come from the
Lords Resistance Army (LRA), a sectarian Acholi-nationalistic group led by Joseph Kony and active
in Northern Uganda. Not only Acholiland has been troubled by rebellion. The second most important
rebel army, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), running on an Islamic radical agenda, was active
in the Western border area of Uganda, close to the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Other areas have also been troubled by traditional tribal and ethnic conicts.
Our empirical strategy exploits an exogenous change in the policy against internal insurgency
1Bellows and Miguel (2009) use a household survey to analyze whether people who have been victimized in the civil
war in Sierra Leone are a¤ected in their post-war behavior. In particular, they nd that more victimized people are more
likely to attend community meetings, and to join social and political groups.
2
that occurred in 2001, after the September 11 attack. The declaration of "war against terror" was a
turning point. In earlier years, the international community had tried without much success to promote
negotiated settlements of the Ugandan conicts.2 In 2001, the US Patriot Act o¢ cially declared the
LRA and the ADF to be terrorist organizations. Among its consequences, the ruling Sudanese National
Islamic Front that had secured sanctuary and military hardware to the LRA withdrew its support to
the rebel army. These shifts provided the opportunity for Musevenis government to pursue a military
crackdown on the rebel armies.3 On the one hand, the ADF was annihilated and has ceased any
signicant military activity within Uganda since 2004. On the other hand, in March 2002, the army
launched a large-scale o¤ensive, named "Operation Iron Fist", against the LRA bases in South Sudan.
The LRA responded by attacking many villages and the government forces in Northern Uganda. Both
ghting sides appear to have exercised brutal violence against civilians (Finnström 2008). Military
activity and reprisals peaked in 2003, then the rebel activity declined considerably as of 2004. In 2005,
the LRA was forced to move its bases to the Democratic Republic of Congo, while the International
Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and other LRA commanders. A cease-re
between the LRA and the government of Uganda was signed on September 2006, with the mediation
of the autonomous government of South Sudan. Negotiations about a permanent settlement continued
in Juba (South Sudan). Although hopes were later frustrated by Konys refusal to sign the peace
agreement in 2008, LRA-related ghting in Uganda has been sporadic after 2006.
Figure 1 shows the total number of geo-referenced ghting events between 1997 and 2008 from
Armed Conicts Location Events Data (ACLED). Between 2000 and 2008 ACLED reports over 2600
geo-located conict events. Consistent with the narrative above, there was a sharp escalation in
2002-04. This is followed by a decline, and very low levels of violence have been recorded since 2006.
It is worth noting that the escalation of violence in 2002-04 is not merely an Acholi phenomenon.
An increasing number of conicts were recorded all over Uganda in this period (see Figure 2). This
justies studying the e¤ect of conict across all Uganda.
We are interested in measuring the e¤ects of such ghting on di¤erent measures of trust and
ethnic identity. To this aim, we exploit two waves of survey data from Afrobarometer 2000 and 2008,
including information on socioeconomic characteristics at the individual level.4 The Afrobarometer is a
repeated cross section of individuals (a panel at the district-level). Our strategy is to regress individual
measures of social capital in year 2008 on county-level measures of intensity of ghting during 2000-08,
2An example of this strategy is the Amnesty Act of 2000, by which the Government of Uganda granted amnesty
to all rebels who would abandon violence, renouncing to criminal prosecution or punishment for o¤enses related to the
insurgency.
3An additional factor was the end of the Second Congo War, which made it possible to the armed forces of Uganda
to concentrate on the internal front.
4Although Afrobarometer also run a survey in 2005, we decided to use the 2008 data, since the number of conicts
was still relatively large in 2005 (see Figure 1). Moreover, the number of people living in refugees was very large in
2005. This raises two issues. On the one hand, the hardship of life in refugee camps may be responsible for the low trust
of respondents. On the other hand, although as we document below most camps are located close to peoples village
of residence, some people may be displaced outside of their counties, rendering our identication strategy invalid. The
problem is far less severe in 2008.
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Figure 1: Number of Fighting Events Over Time in Uganda
controlling for a large number of individual and district characteristics. Most important, we control
for the average social capital at the district level in 2000, in order to lter out the cross-district
heterogeneity due to long-standing factors.
We address concerns about reverse causality and omitted variables by two complementary strate-
gies. First, we adopt an instrumental variables strategy. Our identication relies on an external
political shock (i.e., the US enlisting the rebel movements of Uganda as a terrorist organization, and
the Khartoum government withdrawing support to the LRA) a¤ecting the intensity of ghting, but
having no direct e¤ect on trust measures. This political shock impacted the probability of ghting in
a spatially heterogeneous way with a larger increase observed in high elevation areas and in Northern
Uganda, and more specically close to the Sudanese border. We use the county-level average distance
from Sudan as a rst instrument for the number of ghting events. We use the county-level maximum
altitude as an additional instrument, since this also a¤ects the probability of guerrilla activities (cf.
Collier, Hoe­ er, and Rohner 2009).5
We also consider an alternative identication strategy relying on the within-county variation in
conict involving di¤erent ethnic groups. In particular, we exploit the information provided by ACLED
identifying the rebel groups and ethnic militias involved in each single conict event. When conicts
5Although both instruments are time invariant, our identication relies on the fact that such geographical character-
istics a¤ected the number of ghtings in the post-2001 environment. So, in a sense, our instruments are the interaction
between the 2001 political shock and the above mentioned geographic characteristics.
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involve organized rebel groups, we map each rebel group or ethnic militia (whenever possible) to their
main ethnic a¢ liation. Then, we regress measures of trust and identity on the number of conict events
involving di¤erent ethnic groups within each county, controlling for both county and ethnic group xed
e¤ects. Our hypothesis is that respondents should be especially a¤ected by events involving their own
ethnic group.6
Our main nding is that ghting events have a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on
"trust towards other people from Uganda". The estimated e¤ect is quantitatively large, and robust to
instrumenting ghting events by distance to Sudan and altitude. A one-standard-deviation increase
in ghting translates into a 41% standard deviation decrease in trust. The e¤ect is stronger when
ghting events involve the respondents ethnic group. Fighting has smaller e¤ects, instead, on "trust in
known people" and hardly any e¤ect on "trust in relatives". The ndings suggest that ghting induces
distrust mainly towards people outside the ordinary social network. Moreover, people living in counties
experiencing more ghting report a large increase in a self-reported measure of "ethnic identity", i.e.,
they identify themselves more strongly with their own ethnic group relative to alternative forms of
national Ugandan a¢ liation. This result is robust to the inclusion of county and ethnic group xed
e¤ects. Moreover, the results are not driven by the Acholi region, the most tormented by the conict
between the LRA and the government. Excluding all counties of core Acholiland reduces the size of
the estimated coe¢ cients, but the main results remain signicant.
In Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2011), we argue that by undermining trust, conict hinders
economic cohesion in ethnically divided societies. A thorough empirical investigation of this question
would require a longer time span of data. However, in the second part of the paper, we make a rst step
in this direction by extending the analysis to the economic e¤ects of ethnic conicts. Ideally, we would
like to use district-level GDP per capita. However, such data are not available for Uganda. We resort
to proxying them by using the subjective information contained in the Afrobarometer where people
are asked an assessment of their own economic situation, and then aggregating at the county level
(the same question was asked in both 2000 and 2008, so we can control for the district-level economic
situation in 2000). Since we use the Afrobarometer survey of 2008 (while, recall, most ghting events
are in the period 2002-05), the responses are unlikely to reect the direct economic e¤ects of conict,
due to, e.g., destructions of villages or crops. We document an interesting interaction e¤ect: the
post-war e¤ects of ghting depend on the ethnic fractionalization at the county level. Fighting has
a negative e¤ect on the economic situation in highly fractionalized counties, but has no e¤ect in
less fractionalized counties. Since survey-based data about the economic situation are subject to
perception biases, we repeat the analysis using an alternative proxy of the level of economic activity,
i.e., the average intensity of light recorded by U.S. meteorological satellites during night for each
county in Uganda in our years of interest.
The nding that violence that occurred mostly four-to-ve years before the survey has a stronger
6People may also respond to violence involving their own ethnic group outside of the district where they live. However,
such events are likely to be observed less precisely. Interestingly, we nd that people owning a radio also respond to
out-of-district events involving the own ethnic group.
5
e¤ect on economic outcomes in ethnically fractionalized counties is consistent with the view that
conict hinders economic cooperation in ethnically divided societies. The evidence suggests that the
e¤ects of violence on social capital may have weaker e¤ects on economic cooperation when violence
does not involve ethnic cleavages. Therefore, violence may have more persistent e¤ects in an ethnically
divided society.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is part of a large literature on inter-ethnic conict. Most theoretical papers focus on the
e¤ect of the exogenously given population composition (see, e.g., Esteban and Ray 2008, 2011, and
Rohner 2011). Relative to these papers, our study suggests that ethnic identity may be endogenous
relative to the conict dynamics.7
While our study focuses on the e¤ect of conict on social capital, a large literature has studied
over the last decade the opposite channel, i.e., how di¤erent measures of ethnic diversity predict the
outbreak of civil wars.8 However, there is also a growing number of microlevel studies dealing with
the impact of conicts on human capital. Matching household survey data with information on local
war intensity, some papers document that war experience reduces the educational attainment of the
cohorts exposed (cf. Swee 2008 for Bosnia; Leon 2009 for Peru; Akresh and de Walque 2010 for
Rwanda; Shemyakina 2010 for Tajikistan). Blattman and Annan (2009) nd that former abductees
in Uganda have lower education and lower salaries later in life, as well as more psychological distress.
There is also a literature in medicine, nding that child soldiers or children who experienced war are
much more likely to experience depression, post-traumatic stress or anxiety in the months and years
after the event.9
The studies above focus on human rather than social capital. More directly related to our work
is the recent literature on the e¤ect of individual war experience on political participation and local
collective action. In particular, Bellows and Miguel (2009) use a household survey and analyze whether
people who have been victimized in the civil (not ethnic) war in Sierra Leone are a¤ected in their
post-war behavior. In particular, they nd that more victimized people are more likely to attend
7 In this sense our paper is related to a small literature studying endogenous ethnic identity in contexts that are very
di¤erent.
Fryer and Levitt (2004) show that the intensity of "black" identity in the United States, and the use of distinctively
black names have varied widely over time, peaking during the period of the Black Power movement. In a development
context, Posner (2004) studies the relations between the Chewas and Tumbukas across the border between Malawi and
Zambia. He shows that although the objective di¤erences between these two groups are the same on both sides of the
border, in Malawi the relations between these two ethnic groups are very hostile and lled with distrust, while in Zambia
they are close allies. His explanation is that this is because in Malawi the groups are large enough relative to the other
groups in the country for being mobilized politically, while in Zambia they are both small players that cooperate together.
Finally, Caselli and Coleman (2011) present a theory of ethnic conict where the composition of ethnic groups is
endogenous, as people can switch groups.
8See Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoe­ er (2004), Collier and Rohner (2008), Collier, Hoe­ er and Rohner
(2009), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2011).
9See Dyregrov et al. (2000); Dyregrov, Gjestad and Raundalen, (2002); Barenbaum, Ruchkin and Schwab-Stone
(2004); Derluyn et al. (2004); Kohrt et al. (2008).
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community meetings, and to join social and political groups. Related research focuses on the
reintegration of child soldiers. The study of Blattman (2009) on Northern Uganda nds that young
men who have been abducted and forced into joining rebel forces are subsequently more prone to vote
and engage in local community action. Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) nd that past participation
in abusive military fractions makes reintegration in society harder in Sierra Leone. Further, ideologues,
men and younger ghters have more problems reintegrating than other ex-combatants.
There is also a related literature based on lab and eld experiments. Whitt and Wilson (2007)
make Bosnians play the dictator game and nd that players treat opponents from the same ethnic
group with more fairness. Voors et al. (2010) nd that players who have been exposed to more violence
in their past behave more altruistically to neighbors and are more risk seeking. Cassar, Grosjean and
Whitt (2011) run experiments in Tajikistan and nd that conict exposure reduces trusting and fair
behavior to a larger extent in interactions with other players from the same area than with people
from elsewhere. They explain this nding by the nature of the Tajik war, where clear frontlines were
absent and where there was much violence within villages. To check whether war exposure breads
aggressive behavior in the future, Miguel, Saiegh and Satyanath (2011) study the behavior of foreign
players in the main professional soccer leagues in Europe, nding that indeed past civil war exposure
correlates with the number of yellow and red cards received.
Our paper is also related to the literature linking trust and social capital in communities to past
history and to ethnic fragmentation.10 While Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) nd that participation
in social activities is lower in ethnically heterogenous communities, the same authors show in a later
paper that a recent history of traumatic experiences and discrimination, poverty, low education, ethnic
diversity, and economic inequality correlate with low trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002).11 Using
Afrobarometer and various historical data, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) nd that individuals living
in sub-Saharan African countries whose ancestors belonged to tribes that were subject to a high
intensity of enslavement report lower trust levels today. Our results are complementary to theirs.
While they emphasize persistent e¤ects of events that occurred long time ago, we show that large
contemporaneous shocks can indeed change beliefs and social capital.
Moving to business links, Fafchamps (2000) and Fisman (2003) nd that African rms are more
likely to obtain supplier and bank credit from rms associated to the same ethnic group. Macours
(2004) shows that also in the Guatemalan land rental market  where property rights are mostly
absent and ethnic tensions are stronglandlords are more likely to rent out to tenants from the same
ethnic group. These papers are related to the ndings in our paper that ghting appears to have
larger post-war economic e¤ects in ethnically fractionalized counties. Although we have no direct
measure of inter-ethnic business links, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that inter-ethnic
business links are more sensitive to disruptions associated with the collapse of social capital, and thus
10For a general discussion of the origins and e¤ects of trust and social capital, see the survey articles of Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2006) and Fehr (2009). See also Dasgupta (1988, 1999) and Sobel (2002).
11Related to this, Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) nd that more ethnically and linguistically segregated countries
have a lower quality of government.
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ethnically fractionalized counties su¤er larger economic consequences after ghting.
Finally, our paper is related to the limited literature on the consequences of the conict in Uganda.
Aside from the papers already mentioned above, the most closely related work to ours is Bozzoli, Brueck
and Muhumuza (2011), who analyze the e¤ect of conict on individual expectations in Northern
Uganda. Their paper is complementary to ours insofar as it documents the e¤ect of di¤erential
exposure to conict. However, they use a di¤erent dataset (the Northern Uganda Livelihood Survey)
which only covers the population living in six Northern districts. This survey is only available for
2007, so pre-conict attitudes cannot be controlled for. Most important, their study focuses on a
psychological dimension rather than on trust. In particular, they show that exposure to conict a¤ects
negatively peoples optimism about future perspectives. A recent paper by De Luca and Verpoorten
(2011) studies the e¤ect of conict in Uganda on associational membership and trust.12 Deininger
(2003) analyzes household survey data for Uganda, and nds that households that were more heavily
a¤ected by civil strife are less likely to engage in (non-farm) enterprise expansion or startup and are
more likely to close down an existing enterprise. Vargas Hill, Bernard and Dewina (2008) documents
that in Uganda agricultural "cooperatives were much less likely (...) to exist in communities that had
recently experienced civil conict". Finally, Collier (1999) nds that transaction and capital intensive
sectors like construction, transports, nance, and manufacturing su¤ered relatively more from the war
in Uganda than less vulnerable sectors like subsistence agriculture.
Section 2 describe the historical context of the Ugandan conict. Section 3 describes the data
and empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses the main empirical results of the analysis of the e¤ect of
conict on various measures of trust and ethnic identity. Section 5 analyzes the economic e¤ects of
ethnic conict. Section 6 concludes. A number of additional statistics and robustness tests are in the
Appendix.
2 Context of Conict in Uganda
Already in pre-colonial times the area of what is Uganda today has been ethnically very heterogenous,
with the main division being between the people of the North who are part of the broader ethnic
category of "Nilotes", while the South has been occupied by people belonging to the "Bantu" ethnic
category.13
12To the best of our knowledge, the study of De Luca and Verpoorten (2011) posterior to the rst version of our
paper was carried out independently of ours. The two papers share some common grounds, but di¤er in both the
motivations and key aspects of the analysis. They merge, as we do, data from ACLED and Afrobarometer, although
they use the 2005 survey, while we preferred to use the 2008 survey for reasons explained below. They adopt a di¤erent
econometric specication, although they adopt a similar IV strategy. They focus on associational membership and infer
from the data some "suggestive evidence for a rapid recovery of social capital", two dimensions that we do not touch
upon. They do not control for past trust (which is important in our identication), nor do they consider ethnic identity.
They do not link ghting events to specic ethnic groups, whereas an important part of our contribution is to study
the variation in ethnic violence involving di¤erent groups within each district. Finally, our study considers persistent
economic e¤ects of ethnic violence on living conditions, whereas theirs does not.
13The following discussion of the context of the Ugandan conict draws heavily on Nannyonjo (2005) and Finnström
(2008).
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The ethnic identities were fostered by the British colonization as part of a divide-and-rule strategy.
In particular, the colonial administration restricted interethnic movements, and "colonial practices
were powerful instruments in the making of more rigid ethnic boundaries and divides in Uganda"
(Finnström, 2008: 38). This is conrmed by Nannyonjo (2005), arguing that the British encouraged
the divisions between the North and the Bantu-dominated South. While the Nilotic tribes (and in
particular the Acholi tribe) were over-represented in the army, they were under-represented in the
administration and white-collar jobs, and generally discriminated (Nannyonjo 2005).
Even after independence in 1962, Ugandan politics remained dominated by ethnicity, and each
leader favored some tribes, and repressed others. "Ugandas rst prime minister, Milton Obote, was
overthrown by his army commander Idi Amin in 1971. During Amins regime (1971-79) Langi and
Acholi soldiers, perceived to be Obotes agents, were treated harshly" (Nannyonjo 2005: 475). After
Amin, it was again the turn of Obote to rule the country, who was followed by Acholi o¢ cer Tito
Okello. During this period, the dominant position of northerners in the army was reinstalled, only to be
dismantled again when Okello lost power in 1986 to the former rebel leader of the National Resistance
Army (NRA) and current President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, who is a southerner (Finnström
2008).14 The northerner (and in particular, Acholi) ex-o¢ cers and soldiers of the Ugandan army who
fell from grace under Museveni have since then been important components of the various Northern-
based rebel movements of the last decades. "In April 1987 Joseph Kony started his own military
movement by drawing support mostly from the Acholi UPDA deserters" (Nannyonjo 2005: 476). This
movement eventually became in 1994 the most important and persistent rebel movement of Uganda,
under the name of Lords Resistance Army (LRA).
Although the Lords Resistance Army has increasingly multiplied criminal activities and often
attacked also people from their own ethnic background accused of being traitors, the conict has a
clear ethnic dimension. On one side, there are the northern combatants that used to represent the
o¢ cial army and are now considered rebels, and on the other side there are the southern ghters
of Museveni who used to be rebels and now represent the o¢ cial Ugandan army.15 According to
Nannyonjo (2005: 475), "the current conict in the Acholi and Lango sub-regions between the LRA
and the Ugandan government has deep historical roots resulting from ethnic hostilities, colonial-era
marginalization of the north, institutional weaknesses, troubled politics during the post-independence
period when military sectors of di¤erent ethnic groups aspired to regain power from a succession of
Ugandan governments, and from certain external factors". As expressed by Finnström (2008: 74-
75), "the majority of people in central Uganda perceived Musevenis war as a war against a regime
of northerners, rather than the war for democracy. (...) While he was a guerrilla leader, Museveni
14"Okellos military junta of Acholi-dominated forces withdrew to their homelands in northern Uganda and later to
Sudan, where they formed the Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA) to oppose the NRA" (Nannyonjo 2005:
476-7).
15According to Finnström (2008) the Museveni government has tried hard to frame the Lords Resistence Army as
unpolitical criminals who attack their own people. In particular, "the rhetoric of a local northern conict in which Acholi
kill fellow Acholi like cannibalistic grasshoppers, reects a more general Ugandan conception of the Acholi as violent and
war-prone" (Finnström 2008: 107).
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sometimes propagated Bantu commonality in an e¤ort to strengthen local support in the immediate
war zone. (...) In Musevenis war propaganda, the enemy was alleged to be northerners in general
and Acholi in particular". In the words of the Womens Commission (2001: 81), "the current conict
in northern Uganda has its roots in ethnic mistrust between the Acholi people and the ethnic groups
of central and southern Uganda as well as in the religious and spiritual beliefs of the Acholi people
and the manipulation of these beliefs." And this distrust has persisted, as "still today it is common
for people in Kampala and beyond to regard people from northern Uganda as backward and martial"
(Finnström 2008: 79).
Interestingly, even if the northern population su¤ers not only from large-scale violence and abuse
of the southern government troops (Dolan 2009)16, but is also repeatedly targeted by the Lords Resis-
tance Army, the primary blame and grievances are still directed against the government in Kampala
and the southern Bantu-speaking tribes that it represents. "The more violence the rebels commit
against the noncombatant population, the more the government will be blamed by the same exposed
people for its failure to protect and provide for its citizens. A growing number of young people feel that
the war increasingly excludes them from the various modern developments in Uganda" (Finnström
2008: 129).
The role of Sudan is especially important. Since the early 1990s, the Khartoum government had
provided the LRA with logistic support and military equipment, allowing its base camps in southern
Sudan. In exchange, the LRA helped the Sudanese army to ght against the south Sudanese rebels.
The Ugandan government, in turn, supported the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (Finnström 2008:
84-85). Reciprocal accusations led the two governments to cut diplomatic relationships in 1995,
allegedly because of Sudans support for the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) in retaliation for the
government of Ugandas involvement in the Sudanese governments war against the Sudan Peoples
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In early 1999, the former US President Jimmy Carter chaired
negotiations to restore diplomatic relations (see Neu 2002). Progress was slow, till an acceleration
occurred after September 11, 2001, when the Sudanese government was under heavy pressure for its
support to Islamic radicalism. In 2002 Uganda and Sudan restored diplomatic relations and signed a
protocol which gave the Ugandan army the right to enter southern Sudan and attack the LRA.
Besides this major violent conict between the southern government and the northern rebels of the
Lords Resistance Army, there have been in recent years several other smaller-scale ethnic conicts in
Uganda. For example, the rebels of Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have been ghting the government
in southwestern Uganda, while there has been wide-spread tribal violence in the northeastern Karamoja
region, triggered by cattle raiding (Nannyonjo 2005; Finnström 2008).
16According to Finnström (2008: 71), "in northern Uganda, it turned out that the conduct of the Musevenis troops
(...) soon deteriorated. Killings, rape, and other forms of physical abuse aimed at noncombatants became the order of
the day soon after the soldiers established themselves in Acholiland, which was foreign territory for them".
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3 Econometric Analysis
3.1 Data
In this section, we discuss the original data used. All variables are described in detail in the Data
Appendix, and the descriptive statistics of all variables used are contained in Table 15 in the Appendix.
The backbone of our dataset is the Afrobarometer 2008 survey on Uganda, in which 2431 subjects were
surveyed between July and October 2008, in 55 districts and 125 counties of Uganda.1718 This survey
contains various measures of insecurity, trust and ethnic identity (dependent variables), subjective
assessment of the own living conditions (dependent variable) and socioeconomic status measures that
we use as control variables in the analysis.
In order to control for trust in 2000 and other initial conditions, we use as well the Afrobarometer
2000 survey on Uganda (Afrobarometer 2000), and construct for each subject of the 2008 survey the
level of trust and other controls in 2000 in its district (no information about the respondentscounties
are available in year 2000). While ideally we would have liked to follow particular individuals over
time, this is not possible, since the Afrobarometer is not a panel and surveys di¤erent people in 2008
and in 2000. Hence, we have a repeated cross-section, and districts are the most disaggregated level
for which we can match the data from the 2000 and 2008 Afrobarometer waves.
The main independent variable is called FIGHTING and corresponds to the number of ghting
events that took place in a particular county between 2000 and 2008 (the range is chosen so as to match
the beginning and end dates of the Afrobarometer survey).19 We also use in the analysis alternative
measures of violence, discussed below. The data are from the ACLED (Armed Conict and Location
Event Data, 2011) dataset that provides the geo-location of various categories of ghting events. Using
ArcGIS, we have matched these events with the counties and districts in the Afrobarometer. Between
the 2000 and 2008 Afrobarometer waves ACLED records 2623 ghting events in Uganda, spread in
varying intensity over most regions of Uganda (see Figure 2).
District-level demographic and economic control variables are from the Census of the Ugandan
Bureau of Statistics (2002). These data are not available at the county level. Information on elevation
is from a geo-referenced shape-le produced by Hijmans Lab at UCDavis (2010). Finally, we use the
Geo-Referenced Ethnic Group (GREG) dataset, which allows us to compute ethnic fractionalization
measures on the district and county levels (Weidmann, Rød and Cederman 2010).
17Afrobarometer selects samples in the following way: "The sample is designed as a representative cross-section of all
citizens of voting age in a given country. The goal is to give every adult citizen an equal and known chance of selection
for interview. We strive to reach this objective by (a) strictly applying random selection methods at every stage of
sampling and by (b) applying sampling with probability proportionate to population size wherever possible (...). The
sample is stratied by key social characteristics in the population such as sub-national area (e.g. region/province) and
residential locality (urban or rural)" (Afrobarometer 2011).
18 In Uganda, there are 78 districts which are divided up into 146 counties. The average population of a district in
2009 is about 410000, whereas that of a county is 219000.
19 In particular, we have included all ghting events that have taken place between the last day of the Afrobarometer
2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008).
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Figure 2: Map of Uganda (red dots=conict events, darker green=higher altitude). Source: ACLED
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3.2 Empirical Strategy
We consider the following benchmark econometric model:
Pr(TRUST 08i;c = 1) = 

0 + 1FIGHTING
00 08
c + 2TRUST
00
d +X
0
i + Z
0
d + ui;c

; (1)
where i denotes an individual, c a county, d a district. A county is a sub-unit of a district. We have
information about the county where each individual lives.
The dependent variable, TRUST 08i;c , is the individual measure of trust in year 2008 coming from
the Afrobarometer survey. This binary measure will vary across di¤erent specications as explained
below. In addition to a Probit model, we also estimate a Linear Probability model (OLS) for which
standard statistical tests are available in presence of instrumental variables. Therefore, in equation
(1), the functional (:) is the cdf of a standard normal distribution (in Probit model) or the identity
function (in OLS). FIGHTING00 08c is the main explanatory variable, measuring the number of
ghting events occurring between the two waves of the Afrobarometer of 2000 and 2008 at the county-
level. In alternative specications we consider a measure of ghting aggregated at the district-level. As
robustness check we also consider alternative forms of violence such as the number of episodes involving
violence against civilians, battleeld ghting and number of people who were forced into refugee camps.
Xi is a vector of individual sociodemographic controls including age, education, employment status,
gender, rural/urban location, and ownership of TV. Zd is a vector of district-level controls including
population, urbanization rate, demographic structure, ethnic fractionalization, share of manufacture
and share of subsistence farming. TRUST 00d is a particular control which is singled out because it
plays an especially important role in our identication strategy. It measures the district-level average
trust in year 2000. Hence, equation (1) is akin to a model in rst di¤erence in trust. Note that,
since Afrobarometer is a panel at the district-level and a repeated cross-section at the individual level,
it is possible to lter out past trust in year 2000 only at the district-level. A consequence of this
identication strategy is that we must allow for intracluster correlation of the error terms ui;c within
each county (or district, depending on the specication).
The main coe¢ cient of interest is 1 capturing the e¤ect of county-level ghting on trust. In
order for this coe¢ cient to be estimated consistently, we must address two issues. First, there can
be reverse causality: the intensity of ghting may be determined by the local average trust. Even
though we measure trust at the end of the 2000-08 period, serial correlation in this variable could still
lead to reverse causation. Second, omitted variables correlated with FIGHTING00 08c might bias
the estimate of 1. We address the endogeneity bias issue by an instrumental variable strategy. In
particular, we instrument FIGHTING00 08c by a set of county-level geographic characteristics fGg
that are correlated with the ghting intensity, while having plausibly no direct e¤ect on trust. We
focus in particular on the "distance to Sudan" and the "Maximum elevation".
Distance from Sudan is a natural instrument, since Southern Sudan played a crucial role in the
2002-04 military escalation. In particularly, before 2001 it used to be a safe heaven for rebel movements
most notably the Lords Resistance Army. However, the events following September 11 forced the
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Sudanese government to withdraw its support to the LRA and to let the Ugandan army attack the
LRA bases in Sudanese territory. This triggered the response of the LRA with repeated incursions,
looting and engagements with the army within the Ugandan territory.20
Maximum elevation is also a natural factor a¤ecting ghting. Collier, Hoe­ er, and Rohner (2009)
have shown that countries with a larger proportion of mountainous terrain tend to be more likely to
experience civil wars. They argue that this is because rebels benet from hiding in rough terrain.
Hence, in a setting of classic guerrilla warfare like in Uganda, where clear frontlines and an open
battleeld are lacking, we expect ghting to be most intense in areas close to the rebels hiding
grounds.
It is important to discuss the validity of the exclusion restrictions. These would be violated if the
error term ui;c were correlated with either of the instruments. In this respect, it is crucial that the
set of control variables includes the local average trust in 2000. TRUST 00d lters out the long-run
correlation between fGg and potential omitted factors. For instance, if regions neighboring Sudan were
less inclined to trust and cooperation, due to unobserved historical or cultural factors, such factors
might have a direct e¤ect on TRUST 08d : However, they would as well a¤ect TRUST
00
d ; and as long
as their inuence has not changed after 2000 (other than through ghting), the instruments would
be uncorrelated with the omitted variables conditional on the observables which include TRUST 00d .
To the opposite, problems would arise if ui;c included time varying shocks that are correlated with
the geographical variables (see section 4.6 below). Note that proxies of income are included in the set
of individual control variables, limiting the concern that trust might be a¤ected indirectly through
income.
Another potential concern relates to conict-induced migration: some people may live in 2008
in di¤erent counties from those where they used to live at the time of conict. However, this con-
cern appears to be of limited importance in Uganda. First, although there has been massive forced
displacement of population during the conict, most of it took place within counties: people were
forced to move from rural areas to so-called protected villages established mostly in local trading
centers (UNOCHA 2002, Médecins sans frontières 2004). As a result, cross-county internal migration
is altogether modest over the period. Given that our main explanatory variable is also dened at
the county-level, the results are unlikely be contaminated by cross-county conict-induced migration.
Second, by 2008 the majority of displaced people had returned to their home villages (see UN 2009;
UNHCR 2010). The concern is more severe in 2005, when the number of people living in refugee
camps peaked at 1.8 millions; for this reason we do not use the information in Afrobarometer 2005.
20 If we had a longer span of data and a full dynamic model, the instrument would be the interaction between September
11 and "distance to Sudan". Note that "distance to Sudan" could have a direct permanent e¤ect on trust (if, e.g., Acholi
people trust less the Kampala government than people in the rest of Uganda). However, this e¤ect is ltered out by
TRUST 00d : See the discussion below.
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4 Results
Table 1 presents the main results of our benchmark estimation. The dependent variable is Generalized
trust in 2008. This is coded according to the answer to the question "How much do you trust other
Ugandans?" (question Q84C in Afrobarometer 2008). All specications control for individual sociode-
mographic variables, including age, education, employment status, gender, rural or urban residence,
ownership of a television, and district characteristics, including past average measures (from the 2000
Afrobarometer) of generalized trust, trust in other groups, trust in people from the same group, and
ethnic identity, as well as population, urbanization, demographic structure, ethnic fractionalization,
share of manufacture, and share of subsistence farming.21 In all specications (robust) standard errors
are clustered at the county level. Column (1) reports the marginal e¤ects from a Probit regression of
Generalized trust on All ghting. The estimated marginal e¤ect is negative (-1.8) and highly signi-
cant: people living in counties experiencing a large number of ghting became on average less trustful
towards other Ugandans relative to year 2000.22 In column (2) we report the results of the same
specication as in column (1) using a OLS regression from a linear probability model. The coe¢ cient
of All ghting is very similar to the marginal e¤ect of the Probit model (-1.9). Columns (3)(7) report
the results from IV regressions (using two-stage least square, TSLS) in the linear probability model. In
Appendix A in Table 13 we report the results of the same set of regressions using IV-Probit, which are
very similar. The coe¢ cient of All ghting in the IV regression is -4.2 (Column 3) and it is more than
twice as large in absolute value as its OLS counterpart, and remains statistically signicant. Including
a survey measure from the Afrobarometer of the individual perception of violence (Insecure) does not
alter the results signicantly (see column (4)).23 The result is also robust to alternative county-level
measures of violence, including the number of episodes of violence against civilians (column (5)), bat-
tles (column (6)), and internally displaced people (IDP, column (7)).24 On the contrary, the result
does not hold up to a measure counting the number of riots, which are likely to be less associated
with ethnic conicts. In Appendix A in Table 14 we show that the results of Table 1 continue to hold
when the generalized trust variable is not coded as a dummy, but left at an ordinal scale, and when
Ordered Probit regressions are run.
21These control variables are included in all specications in this section. Unfortunately, the questions of the 2000 and
2008 waves are not identical. A detailed discussion of all variables can be found in Appendix B.
22There is high persistence in trust at the district level: the marginal e¤ect of the district-level measure of generalized
trust in 2000 is close to unity in all regressions of Table 11 (coe¢ cient not shown in the table).
23The measure is based on the individual answers to the question "Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or
anyone in your family: Been physically attacked?"). We do not focus on this individual measure of insecurity, because it
su¤ers from the potential selection into victimization issue discussed by Bellows and Miguel (2009). Although we control
for a number of observable individual characteristics, it is likely to be correlated with unobservable socio-economic or
cultural variables. Yet, it is interesting that the result is robust to controlling for the individual perception of insecurity,
as one might worry about people with selected characteristics driving individual insecurity being oversampled in some
districts.
24We include IDP for two reasons: First, they are a proxy of ghting intensity. Second, forced displacements can be
themselves viewed as a deliberate military strategy in conict (cf. Esteban, Morelli and Rohner 2011). Indeed, some
authors see the protected villages for IDP in Uganda as part of an aggressive military strategy pursued by the Museveni
government to control and oppress the civilian population in the North (Finnström 2008; Dolan 2009).
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Our IV results of Table 1 suggest that ghting events have a causal e¤ect on social capital. Fol-
lowing Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), we performed a robustness check aimed to gauge how severe
the omitted variable bias should be in order for the e¤ect of ghting to be fully driven by unobserved
characteristics. This procedure used (among others) by recent papers of Bellows and Miguel (2009)
and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) assesses the attenuation in the coe¢ cient of ghting when ad-
ditional observable characteristics are included. The smaller the attenuation, the less the estimate is
a¤ected by selection on observables, and the larger the selection on unobservables should be in order to
explain the entire e¤ect of ghting. In our case, the coe¢ cient of All ghting in the OLS specication
including the full set of observables (individual sociodemographics and district-level characteristics) is
estimated to be -1.9 (see column (2) in Table 1). In an unreported regression where the set of controls
is restricted to the four variables measuring past trust in 2000, this point estimate is equal to -1.0. The
absence of attenuation in the coe¢ cient of ghting when a richer set of controls is included provides
additional evidence that the result is unlikely to be fully driven by omitted variables. However the
power of this robustness test depends on the explanatory power of the observable characteristics that
are included. In our case, only six out of sixteen control variables are signicant at the 5% level and
their inclusion increases the R-squared from 0.09 to 0.11.
Table 11 in the Appendix reports the results for the same set of regressions than table 1 when
ghting is measured at the district rather than at the county level. The result are robust: all coef-
cients remain highly signicant, although the coe¢ cients of All ghting are smaller. We interpret
the di¤erence in the size of coe¢ cients as due to the di¤erent size of geographical units and to infor-
mational frictions. Since our ghting variable codes even minor events, people are probably better
informed of events occurring close to their place of residence. Therefore, an additional event occurring
in a county is likely to trigger a stronger response from people living in the same county than an event
happening farther away in the same district.
4.1 First stage regression
Panel (a) of Table 2 reports the coe¢ cients of the excluded instruments in the rst-stage regressions
in Table 1 (columns 1-5). In all cases the IV coe¢ cients are highly signicant with the expected sign.
Robust (Kleinberger-Paap) F-statistics accounting for clustered residuals are large, although they are
in three cases below the conventional "safety threshold" (F=10) to exclude weak instrument bias.25
All rst stage regressions pass the Hansen overidentication test.
We address the potential concern with a weak instrument bias by performing a number of diag-
nostics, following the procedure suggested by Angrist and Pischke (2009: 212-13). Panel (b) of Table
2 reports the coe¢ cient of All ghting in the second stage regression, along with a number of statistics
of the rst-stage regressions from a variety of specications and estimation techniques. Column (1),
25 It is important to recall here that the standard Stock-Yogo critical values to exclude weak instruments are constructed
for the case of i.i.d. residuals, and that they do not apply to the case of clustered standard errors (see, e.g., Bun and de
Haan, 2010). Therefore, the F-statistics provides no precise diagnostic of the weak instrument problem.
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Dependent variable: Generalized Trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting -1.79*** -1.89*** -4.24*** -4.00***
(0.43) (0.39) (1.54) (1.51)
Insecure -0.06**
(0.02)
Violence Civil. -11.35***
(3.95)
Battles -6.10***
(2.26)
IDP -0.67***
(0.19)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259
Pseudo R-squared 0.088 0.109 0.085 0.092 0.075 0.090 0.102
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All
specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV), and districts
characteristics (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urban, Demographic Structure,
Ethnic Fractionalization, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming).
Table 1: The E¤ect of Fighting on Generalized Trust.
reported for comparison, yields the same specication as column (1) in Panel (a). Column (2) shows
how the results would change if only the most powerful instruments, Distance from Sudan, were re-
tained, and the second instrument, Maximum elevation, were dropped. The estimated coe¢ cient of
All ghting remains signicant at the 95% condence level, while the F-statistics increases to 15.8,
safely above the standard thresholds. Next, in column (3) we use a LIML estimator instead of TSLS.
This estimator is less e¢ cient than TSLS but less subject to bias when instruments are weak. The fact
that the results are almost identical to column (1) suggests that there is no signicant bias due to weak
instruments. In column (4), we run a reduced-form regression. The coe¢ cients of the two excluded
instruments have the expected sign and are highly signicant, which is again reassuring. Finally, in
columns (5)-(6) we report the result of a specication where we collapse all variables to the county
level. The results are similar to the benchmark specication using individual level variables. In this
specication, standard errors are not clustered, allowing us to compute standard Cragg-Donald Wald
F-statistics for i.i.d. residuals which can be compared to the Stock-Yogo bounds. We obtain F=9.1
(only marginally below the level of 10) in the case in which both instruments are retained and F=13.2
for the case with only one instrument. We conclude from this analysis that our analysis is not subject
to a weak instrument problem. Although the evidence concerning the instrument Maximum elevation
is somewhat less solid, this is no severe concern, since all results are robust to the just-identied
specication with only one instrument.
Figure 3 provides some informal evidence about the plausibility of the exclusion restriction. The
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Panel A
Dep. var: All fight. All fight. Viol. Civ. Battles IDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dist. from Sudan -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.86***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.12)
Max. elevation 0.02** 0.02** 0.00* 0.01*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259
R-squared 0.646 0.646 0.591 0.546 0.614
Hansen J stat: (p-value) 0.60 0.59 0.70 0.30 0.43
F stat. (Kleibergen-Paap) 8.89 8.55 13.53 6.54 24.23
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at the county level). Significance levels *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Panel B
Dep.var: Generalized Trust in 2008 (Second stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All fighting -4.24*** -5.07** -4.24*** -5.12*** -4.27**
(1.54) (2.08) (1.55) (1.59) (1.83)
Dist. from Sudan 0.52***
(0.20)
Max. elevation -0.06***
(0.02)
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS (LIML) OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instruments Sudan, elev. Sudan Sudan, elev. n/a Sudan, elev. Sudan
Observations 2259 2259 2259 2259 117 117
R-squared 0.085 0.064 0.084 0.109 0.416 0.467
Hansen J stat (p-value) 0.60 n/a 0.60 n/a 0.43 n/a
F stat. (Kleibergen-Paap) 8.886 15.771 8.886 n/a n/a n/a
F stat. (Cragg-Donald) n/a n/a n/a n/a 9.084 13.211
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
Table 2: First Stage of Benchmark Regressions (Panel A) and Robustness IV (Panel B).
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Figure 3: Distance to Sudan and Trust
rst panel considers counties characterized by a positive number of ghting episodes, while the second
panel considers counties in which no ghting occurred. Each gure plots on the horizontal axes the
distance from Sudan, and on the vertical axes the county-level average of generalized trust ltered
by the set of control variables. Remarkably, the relationship is positive and highly signicant across
counties experiencing violence, while it is insignicant across those experiencing no violence. While
this is by no means a formal test of the validity of our exclusion restriction, this falsication analysis
is an interesting observation.
4.2 Quantitative e¤ects
The magnitude of the estimated e¤ects is large.26 The dependent variable, Generalized trust in 2008,
has a sample mean equal to 0.31 with a standard deviation of 0.46. All ghting ranges between 0
and 227 violent events with a standard deviation of 45 events. In table 11, an estimated coe¢ cient
of -4.24 in the TSLS means that a one-standard-deviation increase in All ghting (i.e., 45 additional
episodes of violence) translates into a 41% standard deviation decrease in generalized trust (i.e., a
decrease in generalized trust of approximately 20 percentage points). With the more conservative
OLS estimate we get that a one-standard-deviation increase in All ghting leads to a 18% standard
deviation decrease in generalized trust; the "maximum" e¤ect between counties with no violence and
the county with the highest violence corresponds to a 43 percentage points decrease in trust towards
other Ugandans. This is a very large e¤ect, and is in the order of magnitude of the di¤erence between
26 In all the tables, the ghting variables have been rescaled by a factor 103 in order to improve readability of their
estimated coe¢ cients.
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Dependent variable: Trust in Known People in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting -1.62*** -1.65*** -2.94** -2.59**
(0.35) (0.36) (1.22) (1.16)
Insecure -0.08***
(0.03)
Violence Civil. -6.42*
(3.33)
Battles -4.67***
(1.78)
IDP -0.35*
(0.19)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257 2257
Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.064 0.058 0.065 0.056 0.057 0.065
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV),
and districts characteristics (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urban,
Demographic Structure, Ethnic Fractionalization, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming).
Table 3: Trust in Known People.
Netherlands (0.48), the eighth most trusting country in world, and the three countries with the lowest
trust levels (Peru (0.05), Brazil (0.05); Philippines (0.06)).27 The quantitative e¤ects are similar when
alternative measures of violence are considered.
4.3 Other dimensions of trust
Table 3 is the analogue of Table 1 when the dependent variable is replaced by Trust in known people.
This variable is based on the answer to the question "How much do you trust other people you know?"
(Afrobarometer 2008, question Q84B). The estimated e¤ects of violence are signicantly smaller than
in the case of Generalized trust, although they remain statistically signicant.
In Table 4, the dependent variable is Trust in relatives in 2008, which is based on the answer to
the question "How much do you trust your relatives?" (Afrobarometer 2008, question Q84A). In this
case, the e¤ects are even smaller and become insignicant in the TSLS regressions. This nding is
partially di¤erent from Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), who nd that a past history of enslavement has
a negative e¤ect on all dimension of trust, including trust in relatives. This suggests that the e¤ect of
local ethnic conicts is less pervasive and mostly conned to the inter-ethnic dimension.
27These gures correspond to the average percentage of respondents answering "Most people can be trusted" to the
World Values Survey Question A165 "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
need to be very careful in dealing with people?". We use the average scores over the rst three waves of the World Values
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Dependent variable: Trust in Relatives in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting -0.84*** -0.85** -0.49 -0.29
(0.31) (0.33) (0.95) (0.99)
Insecure -0.05**
(0.02)
Violence Civil. -1.05
(2.31)
Battles -0.79
(1.46)
IDP -0.06
(0.13)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2264 2264 2264 2264 2264 2264 2264
Pseudo R-squared 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.042 0.040 0.041 0.038
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV),
and districts characteristics (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urban,
Demographic Structure, Ethnic Fractionalization, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming).
Table 4: Trust in Relatives.
4.4 Ethnic identity
To corroborate this view further, we replace trust by a measure of Ethnic identity, based on the answer
to the question "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Ugandan and being a _ [Rs
Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?" (Afrobarometer 2008, question
Q83). Results are reported in Table 5. The estimated coe¢ cient of interest is in all cases positive and
signicant.28 In the TSLS regression, a one standard deviation increase in All ghting translates into
a 34% standard deviation increase in ethnic identity (i.e. 13.8 percentage point). The estimated e¤ect
between the least and most conictive districts is a 68.1 percentage points increase in ethnic identity.
The quantitative e¤ects are similar when alternative measures of violence are considered. The results
are robust to running all regressions at the district, as opposed to the county level.
The rst-stage regressions yield similar results to those discussed above for the case of generalized
trust (see Appendix, Table 10). Concerning the falsication test, the two panels in Figure 4 show that
the distance from Sudan is negatively correlated with the ethnic identity (conditional on the set of
control variables) across districts experiencing violence, whereas the relationship is insignicant across
Survey.
28We repated the test of Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) with ethnic identity as a dependent variable. The point
estimate of "All ghting" is 0.34 when the (restricted) set of controls is included, while it is equal to 0.73 when the full
set of controls is included.
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Dependent variable: Ethnic Identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting 0.64** 0.73** 3.00** 2.71**
(0.32) (0.35) (1.27) (1.18)
Insecure 0.07***
(0.02)
Violence Civil. 8.56***
(3.07)
Battles 4.16**
(1.90)
IDP 0.51***
(0.14)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2266 2266 2266 2266 2266 2266 2266
Pseudo R-squared 0.031 0.032 0.001 0.013 0.00 0.009 0.013
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV),
and districts characteristics (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urban,
Demographic Structure, Ethnic Fractionalization, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming).
Table 5: Ethnic Identity.
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Figure 4: Distance to Sudan and Ethnic Identity
districts experiencing no violence. Similarly to the case of trust, distance to Sudan appears to have
an e¤ect on ethnic identity only in the subsample of districts exposed to some ghting.
Finally, we note that in all the regressions discussed in this section the (unreported) coe¢ cient of
ethnic fractionalization does not appear to have a signicant e¤ect on trust or ethnic identity in 2008.
This is not surprising, since there is little time variation in fractionalization, and any time invariant
e¤ect has been ltered out through controlling for measures of trust in 2000. More interesting, one
could expect heterogenous e¤ects on trust depending on the extent of fractionalization. Consistent
with such an hypothesis, when we split the sample between the most fractionalized quartile and
the three least fractionalized quartiles (which is a sensible threshold, since most districts have zero
fractionalization), it appears as if trust and ethnic identity are signicantly more a¤ected in high-
fractionalization districts. However, the result is not robust: an OLS specication with an interaction
yields an insignicant coe¢ cient.
Table 12 in the Appendix A shows that the results on ethnic identity carry over if the analysis is
performed at the district rather than county level.
4.5 Excluding Acholiland
The previous results are not entirely driven by Acholiland, the troubled region in the North where
most of the ghting between the government and the LRA took place. Here we focus on the robustness
of our benchmark TSLS estimates and restrict attention to the dependent variables Generalized trust
(Column 3 in Table 11) and Ethnic identity (Column 3 in Table 5). The results are reported in the
Appendix Table 9. Columns (1)-(4) refer to the regression for Generalized trust. In column (1) we
add a dummy coding for all counties in districts classied as Acholi by the Geo-Referenced Ethnic
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Group (GREG) dataset (Weidmann, Rød and Cederman 2010).29 The dummy is insignicant and
our coe¢ cient of interest is close to its benchmark estimate. In column (2) we add a dummy variable
coding for all districts classied as Acholi by the Ethnologue (ETHNO) denition of Acholiland (Lewis
(ed.) 2009). The dummy is again insignicant and the coe¢ cient of interest is stable. In column (3) we
remove from the sample the districts classied as Acholi by GREG, and in column (4) we remove from
the sample the districts classied as Acholi by ETHNO. In neither case are the results signicantly
di¤erent from the benchmark specication of Table 1. In columns (5)-(8) we perform the corresponding
analysis for Ethnic identity (Table 5). The results are again fully robust.
4.6 Within-County Ethnic Violence
In the previous sections, we have shown that violence across Ugandan counties is negatively associated
with changes in trust towards other Ugandans, and positively associated with changes in ethnic iden-
tity. In this section, we propose an alternative econometric specication addressing two related issues.
First, we would like to cast more light on the mechanism linking violence to trust. The evidence pre-
sented so far could be driven by the mere exposure to conict and violence. However, some theories
including our earlier work in Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti (2011) link the e¤ect of war on social
capital hinges to inter-ethnic relationships. According to this view, peoples beliefs should respond to
violence targeting their own ethnic group rather (or more) than to generic violence occurring within
their own county. Second, the cross-county identication is subject to a caveat. Counties might be
subject to unobservable shocks correlated with both a high incidence of conict and low trust. For
example, the government might have reduced during the period under consideration transfers or public
goods to districts (or counties) populated by hostile ethnic groups. Unfortunately, we have no direct
measure of such policies.
To make progress in this direction, we exploit spatialethnic variations in violence. We use the
information provided by ACLED about the nature of each conict event. Each episode is classied as
involving specic rebel groups or ethnic militias, civilians, or the Ugandan army. Many rebel groups
have a main ethnic a¢ liation, e.g. events involving the LRA can be linked to the Acholi group.
Therefore, we can associate most events with one or more ethnic groups involved, as well as with the
counties where they occurred.30 Having constructed such a variable, we identify the e¤ect of violence
on trust and ethnic identity out of the within-county variation in the number of events involving
di¤erent ethnic groups, after controlling for both county and ethnic group xed e¤ects.
To begin with, column (1) of Table 6 we replicate the Logit specication of Column (1) in Table 1
after splitting the variable All ghting at the county-level into events involving (i.e. Fight(Tr,Cou)) and
not involving (i.e. Fight(OtherTr,Cou)) the respondents ethnic group. The coe¢ cient of Fight(Tr,Cou)
29 In particular, this dummy codes as one all counties where Acholis are the largest ethnic group everywhere in the
territory according to GREG.
30We have followed a conservative matching strategy, only linking events that can be attributed with a very high
condence to particular groups. The results are very similar when a more agressive matching strategy is used, or when
particular rebel groups are removed. The matching table is available from the authors upon publication.
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Dep. var.: Gen. Trust Gen. Trust Gen. Trust Identity Identity Identity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fight(OtherTr,Cou) -1.20* 0.25
(0.68) (0.56)
Fight(Tr,Cou) -1.91*** 0.70**
(0.49) (0.31)
Fight(Tr)*Fight(Cou) -0.38 -0.47 1.76* 1.73**
(0.67) (0.69) (0.95) (0.86)
Fight(Tr)*Radio -0.08** 0.07*
(0.04) (0.04)
Own Radio 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.03)
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Fixed Effects No County, Tribe County, Tribe No County, Tribe County, Tribe
Observations 2259 2358 2357 2266 2290 2289
R-squared 0.088 0.195 0.197 0.031 0.107 0.110
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender,
Rural, Own TV), and columns (1) and (4) for districts characteristics (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own
Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urban, Demographic Structure, Ethnic Fractionalization, Share of
Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming).
Table 6: Ethnic Fighting, Generalized Trust and Identity.
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is larger in absolute value than the coe¢ cient of Fight(OtherTr,Cou) and their di¤erence is statistically
signicant. Column (4) reports the coe¢ cient for the same regression where the dependent is Ethnic
identity (cf. Table 5). The qualitative results are similar. These regressions show that ghting events
linked to a respondents own ethnic group have a stronger e¤ect on Generalized trust and Ethnic
identity than have ghting events involving other ethnic groups.
Next, we consider a more demanding econometric specication including both county (FEc) and
ethnic (FEe) xed e¤ect:
Pr(TRUST 08i;c;e = 1) = 

0 + FEc + FEe + 1
 
FIGHT 00 08c  FIGHT 00 08e

+X0i + ui;c;e

:
(2)
In this specication (where e stands for ethnic group), the main explanatory variable is an inter-
action term taking on the value one whenever a ghting occurs in the county of which the respondent
is resident and involves the ethnic group of the respondent. In this specication, all district-level
controls are absorbed by the county xed e¤ects. The set of individual controls Xi is the same as
before.31 The main results are presented in column (2) (for Generalized trust) and column (5) (for
Ethnic identity). The point estimate of the interaction e¤ects are, as expected, negative (-0.4) and
positive (1.8), respectively, but the coe¢ cient is statistically signicant (at the 10% level) only in the
regression for Ethnic identity. In columns (3) and (6), we consider the e¤ect of exposure to news of
ethnic violence anywhere in Uganda. To this aim, we include an interaction between the ownership of
a radio (a binary variable included in all specications) and the number of ghting at the Ugandan
national level involving the respondents group. As expected the interaction coe¢ cient is negative
and signicant (-0.08) in the case of Generalized trust, and positive and signicant (0.07) in the case
of Ethnic identity. People owning a radio are more responsive to the news of violence involving their
own ethnic group anywhere in Uganda.32 Note also that in this specication the coe¢ cient of 1 is
signicant at the 95% level in the case of Ethnic identity.
In conclusion, this section shows that the ethnic channel plays a crucial role in driving the e¤ects
of violence on social capital. Since all results are robust to controlling for Insecurity, the results do
not appear to be driven by members of specic groups feeling subject to stronger personal threat.
Moreover, the within-county results show that the increase in ethnic identity is not driven by target
government policies, i.e., by the government spending less on hostile districts or counties. A caveat
31We do not include among the control the self-reported insecurity measure, due to its likely endogeneity. However,
all results are robust to its inclusion.
32We interpret this result as an interesting correlation. There is a growing literature studying politico-economic e¤ects
of mass media (see Strömberg 2004 for a seminal contribution). Recent applications to ethnic conict include Della
Vigna et al. (2011), and Yanagizawa (2010), focusing respectively on partisan radio broadcasting in the Serbo-Croatian
and Rwandan conicts. These papers show that an exogenous increase in the exposure to radical news a¤ects peoples
attitude about ongoing conicts. In this paper, we do not try to identify exogenous variation in the exposure to radio
broadcasting. Thus, the e¤ect identied by our regression could reect some self-selection of individuals in the decision
of owning a radio.
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is that we cannot instrument the within-county variation in events involving di¤erent ethnic groups.
Yet, we believe the two strategies discussed in the sections above to provide evidence of a causal e¤ect
of ethnic conict of di¤erent dimensions of social capital.
5 The Heterogenous E¤ects of Conict on Economic Activity
In this section we study the e¤ect of violence on economic outcomes and living standards. Ideally, we
would like to use county- or district-level GDP statistics, but this is not available in Uganda. We use
two alternative proxies. First, we code a dummy variable using the responses to the Afrobarometer
2008 question about individual living conditions. We set the variable equal to one whenever the survey
respondent declares his living conditions to be either good or very good. We set it to zero when he
declares them to be either bad or very bad. The main problem of this variable is that it reects
subjective assessments that may be a¤ected by non-economic components of well-being. Second, we
use Satellite Nightlight Data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2010).
The raw data is produced by meteorologic satellites that measure light intensity during night. These
data have been used in recent research as a proxy for economic activity (cf. for example Henderson,
Storeygard, and Weil 2011, and Hodler and Raschky 2011). The exact data construction is detailed
in the Data Appendix.
The focal point of our analysis is the extent to which the e¤ect of violence is heterogenous across
counties characterized by di¤erent ethnic fractionalization. In particular, our hypothesis is that if
conict destroys inter-ethnic trust, more fractionalized districts that depend more heavily on inter-
ethnic business would su¤er stronger and more persistent economic e¤ects.
When the dependent variable is the individual self-declared measure of living condition, we estimate
the following equation:
LIV ING_COND08i;c = [0 + 1LIV ING_COND
00
d + 2FIGHTING
00 08
c + 3FRACc (3)
+4FIGHTING
00 08
c  FRACc +X0i + Z0d + ui;c]:
The main coe¢ cient of interest is 4:
The results are reported in Table 7. Column (1) shows that neither the level of ghting nor the
extent of fractionalization have an e¤ect on average living conditions once past living conditions and
other covariates (including individual trust) are controlled for. However, column (2) shows that there
is a negative and signicant interaction e¤ect: Fighting a¤ects living condition negatively in more
fractionalized counties. The main e¤ects are measured at a zero level of fractionalization. Therefore,
the coe¢ cient on All ghting (which is always insignicant) shows that violence has no economic
e¤ect in non-fractionalized districts. Columns (6)-(8) show that the results of column (2) carry over
to all alternative measures of violence. The result is robust to using OLS instead of Probit (column
(3)). Unfortunately, we face well-known di¢ culties in instrumenting the interaction terms. To make
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Dependent variable: Living Conditions in 2008
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Liv. cond. 2000 0.26** 0.27** 0.27** 0.11 0.74*** 0.21 0.30** 0.21
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.25) (0.18) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
All fighting -0.57 -0.37 -0.37 -1.34 -14.31*
(0.36) (0.33) (0.33) (1.42) (7.55)
Ethnic frac. -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.17 -0.40 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.24) (0.28) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Fighting*Frac -6.13* -5.86*
(3.63) (3.41)
Civ. viol. -1.87*
(1.12)
Civ.*Frac -17.63*
(9.01)
Battles -0.26
(0.44)
Battles*Frac -8.22*
(4.57)
IDP -0.13*
(0.08)
IDP*Frac -0.88*
(0.46)
Method Probit Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS Probit Probit Probit
Sample All All All Low Frac. High Frac. All All All
Observations 2247 2247 2247 1691 556 2247 2247 2247
R-squared 0.043 0.044 0.060 0.065 0.100 0.047 0.043 0.047
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All
specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV), and districts
characteristics (Population, Urban, Demographic structure, Ethnic Fractionalization, Share of Manufacture, Share of subsistence
Farming).
Table 7: Explaining Living Conditions in 2008.
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progress in this direction, we followed Besley and Persson (2011) splitting the sample into high- and
low-fractionalization counties and instrument separately in each regression the main e¤ect. Since 47%
of the counties have no fractionalization, and 75% have a measure of fractionalization below 23%,
we decided to split the sample between the three lowest quartiles (low-fractionalization counties) and
the highest quartile (high-fractionalization counties). The coe¢ cient of interest are now those of All
ghting in columns (4)(5). Fighting generates a large and signicant fall in living conditions in
high-fractionalization counties (column (4)), whereas there is no signicant e¤ect in less fractionalized
counties (column (4)).33 The nding that violence that occurred mostly in 2002-2004, henceforth
four-to-ve years before data collection (in 2008), has a negative e¤ect on economic outcomes in
ethnically fractionalized counties is consistent with the view that conict hinders economic cooperation
in ethnically divided societies. The evidence suggests that the e¤ects of violence on social capital
may have weaker e¤ects on economic cooperation when violence does not involve ethnic cleavages.
Therefore, violence may have more persistent e¤ects in ethnically divided areas.
In Table 8, we replace LIV ING_COND08i in equation (3) with SAT_LIGHT
08
c ; a county-level
average of satellite light which proxies for local GDP. We also replace LIV ING_COND00d with
SAT_LIGHT 00c : Interestingly, the satellite light data is signicantly autocorrelated, showing that
there is signal in the data. Since the dependent variable is at the county level, we drop all individual
control variables. Also, we use a Tobit regressor since satellite light data are censored at zero. Column
(1) in Table 8 is consistent with column (1) in Table 7. Neither All ghting nor Ethnic Fractionalization
have a signicant explanatory power in the regression. Column (2) shows that there is a strong and
signicant interaction e¤ect, also consistent with Column (2) in Table 7. Columns (5)-(7) show that
the result holds up to alternative measures of violence. In the columns (3) and (4) the sample is split
into low- and high-fractionalization counties and IVTobit regressions are run. The coe¢ cient of All
ghting is ten times larger in high-fractionalization counties than in low-fractionalization counties,
although both are statistically insignicant.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the e¤ect of civil conict on social capital, focusing on the experience of Uganda
during the last decade. Using individual and county-level data, we document causal e¤ects of an
outburst of civil conict in 2002-04, driven by an exogenous shock, on post-conict trust and ethnic
identity. We nd that the extent of ghting has a strong and statistically signicant negative impact
on Trust towards other Ugandans between 2000 and 2008. The estimated e¤ect is quantitatively
large and robust to a number of control variables, alternative measures of violence and di¤erent
statistical techniques. The e¤ects on Trust in relatives is insignicant. On the contrary, people living
in districts experiencing more violence report a strong increase in a measure of Ethnic identity, i.e.,
33The smaller sample size in the split sample reduces the power of the rst-stage regression, causing a concern with a
weak-instrument problem. The Kleibergen-Paap F-stats for the two separate IV regressions are, respectively, 4.53 and
6.73.
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Dependent variable: Satellite light in 2008
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sat.light (2000) 0.82*** 0.83*** 0.80*** 0.92*** 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.82***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
All fighting -0.59 -0.24 -2.17 -22.97
(1.24) (1.26) (1.86) (18.41)
Ethnic frac. 0.05 0.15 1.65 0.04 0.15 0.13 0.12
(0.13) (0.12) (1.85) (0.65) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Fighting*Frac -28.64**
(14.06)
Civ. viol. -0.15
(2.92)
Civ.*Frac -69.44**
(33.21)
Battles -0.25
(1.97)
Battles*Frac -43.91*
(26.42)
IDP -0.04
(0.14)
IDP*Frac -8.93**
(3.98)
Method Tobit Tobit IVTobit IVTobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Sample All All Low Frac. High Frac. All All All
Observations 125 125 75 43 125 125 125
Log Pseudolikelihood -22.09 -19.77 137.28 140.74 -19.50 -20.41 -19.08
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for
districts characteristics (Population, Urban, Demographic structure, Ethnic Fractionalization, Share of Manufacture, Share of
subsistence Farming).
Table 8: Explaining Living Conditions in 2008 (Measured Using Satellite Light Data).
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they identify themselves more strongly with their own ethnic group relative to alternative forms of
national a¢ liation. Thus, conict appears to strengthen within-ethnic group solidarity. This nding
is consistent with the casual evidence that social capital is strengthened by external wars: countries
acquire a stronger internal cohesion.
The results are robust to an instrumental variable strategy exploiting an external political shock
that occurred in 2001. In addition, the ndings about ethnic identity (and, to a lesser extent, those
about generalized trust) are robust to a demanding identication strategy relying on the variation
within each district in the ethnic violence involving di¤erent ethnic groups. This specication controls
for both district and ethnic groups xed e¤ect. The importance of ethnic elements suggests that
the destruction of social capital may not be a psychological response due to the mere experience of
violence. Nor do the ndings appear to be driven by fear or insecurity at the individual level, since
these are controlled in some of our regressions.
We also study the economic e¤ects of conict. Few years after the conict outburst, the intensity of
ghting has a negative e¤ect on the economic situation in highly fractionalized counties, but no e¤ect
in less fractionalized counties. We interpret this nding as consistent with recent theories emphasizing
the negative e¤ect of ethnic conict on inter-ethnic economic cooperation and business links, that we
studied from a theoretical perspective in a recent companion paper (Rohner, Thoenig and Zilibotti
2011). Our ndings also suggest the existence of a self-reinforcing process between conicts and ethnic
cleavages.
We plan to extend the approach in this paper to the study of conict in other African countries.
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Dep. var.: Gen. Trust Gen. Trust Gen. Trust Gen. Trust Identity Identity Identity Identity
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All fighting -4.58** -6.35** -6.85** -6.39** 3.51** 5.91*** 7.01*** 6.04***
(1.95) (2.56) (3.11) (2.58) (1.71) (1.68) (2.69) (1.68)
AcholiLandGREG 0.07 -0.11
(0.10) (0.08)
AcholiLandETHNO 0.60 -0.77***
(0.40) (0.28)
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Sample Full Full
w/o
AchGREG
w/o
AchETHN Full Full
w/o
AchGREG
w/o
AchETHN
Observations 2259 2259 1973 2163 2266 2266 1980 2170
R-squared 0.078 0.062 0.091 0.087 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All
specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV), and districts
characteristics (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urban, Demographic Structure, Ethnic
Fractionalization, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming).
Table 9: Robustness to removing Acholi regions
Appendix A: Additional Tables
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Panel A
Dep. var: All fight. All fight. Viol. Civ. Battles IDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dist. from Sudan -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.87***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.12)
Max. elevation 0.02** 0.02** 0.00* 0.01*** 0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Observations 2266 2266 2266 2266 2266
R-squared 0.647 0.647 0.591 0.546 0.614
Hansen J stat: (p-value) 0.18 0.15 0.77 0.03 0.96
F stat. (Kleibergen-Paap) 8.89 8.55 13.53 6.55 24.26
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at the county level). Significance levels *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Panel B
Dep.var: Ethnic Identity in 2008 (Second stage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All fighting 3.00** 4.50*** 3.02** 4.11*** 4.63***
(1.27) (1.41) (1.28) (1.25) (1.60)
Dist. from Sudan -0.45***
(0.10)
Max. elevation 0.04*
(0.02)
Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS (LIML) OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Instruments Sudan, elev. Sudan Sudan, elev. n/a Sudan, elev. Sudan
Observations 2266 2266 2266 2266 117 117
R-squared 0.001 0.16 0.001 0.040 0.66 0.63
Hansen J stat (p-value) 0.18 n/a 0.18 n/a 0.54 n/a
F stat. (Kleibergen-Paap) 8.892 15.788 8.892 n/a n/a n/a
F stat. (Cragg-Donald) n/a n/a n/a n/a 9.084 13.211
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01.
Table 10: First Stage of Benchmark Regressions (Panel A) and Robustness IV (Panel B) for Identity.
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Dependent variable: Generalized Trust in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting -0.70*** -0.70*** -1.36** -1.30**
(0.13) (0.14) (0.58) (0.57)
Insecure -0.05**
(0.02)
Violence Civil. -2.64**
(1.27)
Battles -2.49**
(0.98)
IDP -0.66***
(0.24)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259 2259
Pseudo R-squared 0.091 0.112 0.095 0.100 0.096 0.090 0.103
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at district level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV),
and districts characteristics (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urban,
Demographic Structure, Ethnic Fractionalization, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming).
Table 11: The E¤ect of Fighting on Generalized Trust (District Level).
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Dependent variable: Ethnic Identity in 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All fighting 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.99*** 0.92**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.37) (0.36)
Insecure 0.06**
(0.03)
Violence Civil. 2.13***
(0.76)
Battles 1.70**
(0.67)
IDP 0.46***
(0.15)
Method Probit OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Observations 2266 2266 2266 2266 2266 2266 2266
Pseudo R-squared 0.034 0.035 0.015 0.023 0.020 0.011 0.019
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at district level). Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
All specifications control for unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV),
and districts characteristics (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urban,
Demographic Structure, Ethnic Fractionalization, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming).
Table 12: Ethnic Identity (District Level).
Dep. Var: Trust gen. Trust know. Trust rel. Identity
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
All fighting -3.66*** -2.83*** -0.61 2.81**
(1.32) (1.06) (1.00) (1.19)
Method IVProbit IVProbit IVProbit IVProbit
Observations 2259 2257 2264 2266
Log Pseudolikelihood 3571.70 3372.15 3893.72 3763.03
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level).
Significance levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for
unreported individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender,
Rural, Own TV), and districts characteristics (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in
Own Group, Past Ethnic Identity, Population, Urban, Demographic Structure,
Ethnic Fractionalization, Share of Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming).
Table 13: Robustness to using IVProbit.
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Dep. Var: Generalized trust in 2008 (ordinal scale)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
All fighting -4.60***
(0.92)
Viol. Civil. -9.95***
(2.29)
Battles -7.46***
(1.51)
IDP -0.96***
(0.15)
Method
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
Ordered
Probit
Observations 2259 2259 2259 2259
Pseudo R-sq. 0.050 0.048 0.051 0.053
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust, clustered at county level). Significance
levels * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All specifications control for unreported
individual sociodemographics (Age, Education, Employed, Gender, Rural, Own TV), and
districts characteristics (Past Generalized Trust, Past Trust in Own Group, Past Ethnic
Identity, Population, Urban, Demographic Structure, Ethnic Fractionalization, Share of
Manufacture, Share of Subsistence Farming).
Table 14: Robustness to using Ordered Probit.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Trust variables:
Trust generalized 2008 2424 .3180693 .4658226 0 1
Trust known people 2008 2422 .5396367 .4985294 0 1
Trust relatives 2008 2429 .8369699 .3694692 0 1
Ethnic identity 2008 2431 .2073221 .4054717 0 1
Trust generalized 2000 2279 .1553152 .1020895 0 .34375
Trust own group 2000 2279 .8197781 .1325227 .4722222 1
Trust in others 2000 2279 .7015967 .1357914 .3958333 .9375
Ethnic identity 2000 2279 0.1212459 0.0804707 0 0.3191489
Fighting variables (main specification):
Fighting events 2431 21.3262 45.9608 0 227
Violence against civilians 2431 7.946935 16.83046 0 94
Battles 2431 9.881119 26.42823 0 141
IDP 2431 0.0993206 0.250148 0 0.9458593
Socio-demographic variables:
Age 2421 33.70921 12.28614 18 81
Education 2431 .4960921 .5000876 0 1
Own TV 2428 .1214992 .3267738 0 1
Own radio 2430 .7353909 .4412156 0 1
Employed 2431 .3973673 .4894539 0 1
Female 2431 1.499383 .5001025 1 2
Urban 2431 1.79926 .4006367 1 2
District level variables:
Population District 2431 588125.4 277121.5 127064 1189142
Urbanization District 2431 13.28453 22.4144 1.1 100
Age Dependency Ratio 2431 110.7223 14.7269 64.2 132.8
Fractionalization 2431 .131371 .1885135 0 .6659015
Manufacturing District 2431 2.39239 1.952001 .2 9.5
Subsistence Farming District 2431 30.64801 21.05091 7.5 97.9
Living condition variables:
Living conditions 2008 2420 .4801653 .4997097 0 1
Living conditions 2000 2279 .5599112 .1426186 .2363636 .8125
Instruments:
Distance from Sudan (in km) 2431 271.0786 132.5202 0 529.7582
Maximum elevation 2431 1605.039 748.8192 875 4688
Satellite Light:
Satellite Light 2008 125 .2728527 .8278942 0 6.753723
Satellite Light 2000 125 .3233163 .8965602 0 7.117774
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics
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Appendix B: Data
Variables used in Section 3.2
First the dependent variables:
Generalized trust (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking
a value of 1 if "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot" is answered to the question "How
much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other Ugandans?" from the Afrobarometer
2008 (question Q84C).
Trust in Known People (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level
and taking a value of 1 if "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot" is answered to the question
"How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other people you know?" from the
Afrobarometer 2008 (question Q84B).
Trust in relatives (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking
a value of 1 if "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a lot" is answered to the question "How
much do you trust each of the following types of people: Your relatives?" from the Afrobarometer
2008 (question Q84A).
Ethnic identity (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking
a value of 1 if "I feel only (Rs ethnic group)" or "I feel more (Rs ethnic group) than Ugandan" is
answered to the question "Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a Ugandan and being
a _ [Rs Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?" from the Afrobarometer
2008 (question Q83).
The main independent variables:
Generalized trust (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the percentage
of respondents in a given district who answer "Most people can be trusted" to the question "Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you must be very careful in dealing
with people?" from the Afrobarometer 2000 (question Q59).
Trust in other groups (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the
percentage of respondents in a given district who answer "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a
lot" to the question "I am now going to read you a list of people and organizations. How much do you
trust each of them to do what is right? Ugandans from other ethnic groups" from the Afrobarometer
2000 (question Q60B).
Trust in own group (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the
percentage of respondents in a given district who answer "I trust them somewhat" or "I trust them a
lot" to the question "I am now going to read you a list of people and organizations. How much do you
trust each of them to do what is right? Someone from your own ethnic group" from the Afrobarometer
2000 (question Q60A).
Ethnic identity (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the percentage
of respondents in a given district who answer "Ethnic" to the question "We have spoken to many
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Ugandans and they have all described themselves in di¤erent ways. Some people describe themselves
in terms of their region, language, ethnic group, religion, or gender. Others describe themselves in
economic terms, such as working class, middle class, or according to their occupation (e.g. a farmer
or a housewife). Besides being Ugandan, which specic group do you feel you belong to rst and
foremost?" from the Afrobarometer 2000 (question Q18).
Insecure: This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking a value of 0
if "Never" is answered and a value of 1 if "Just once or twice", "Several times", "Many times",
"Always", or "Dont know" is answered to the question "Over the past year, how often, if ever, have
you or anyone in your family: Been physically attacked?" from the Afrobarometer 2008 (question
Q9C).
Fighting (County): Taking the Acled (2011) dataset, we have generated with the help of ArcGIS
the number of violent events per county. In particular, this variable varies on the county level,
and corresponds to the total amount of all violent events in a county taking place between the last
day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst day of the Afrobarometer
2008 survey (on July 27, 2008). It corresponds to the sum of the events of the following "Event
Type": "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No change of territory", "Battle-Rebels gain
territory", "Riots/Protests", and "Violence against civilians".
Violence Against Civilians (County): Taking the Acled (2011) dataset, we have generated
with the help of ArcGIS the number of violent events per county. In particular, this variable varies on
the county level, and corresponds to the total amount of all events of the "Event Type" of "Violence
against civilians" in a county taking place between the last day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on
June 26, 2000) and the rst day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008).
Battles (County): Taking the Acled (2011) dataset, we have generated with the help of ArcGIS
the number of violent events per county. In particular, this variable varies on the county level, and
corresponds to the total amount of all battle events in a county taking place between the last day
of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst day of the Afrobarometer 2008
survey (on July 27, 2008). Concretely, it corresponds to the sum of the events of the following "Event
Type": "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No change of territory", and "Battle-Rebels
gain territory".
Internally Displaced People (IDP): Total number of internally displaced people per district
in 2006 (From UNHCR, 2006).
Fighting (Tribe): Taking the Acled (2011) dataset, we have matched all ghting events to a
particular tribe (Q79) in the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (where feasible). In particular, this variable
varies on the tribe level, and corresponds to the total amount of all violent events linked to a tribe
taking place between the last day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26, 2000) and the rst
day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008). It corresponds to the sum of the events of
the following "Event Type": "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No change of territory",
"Battle-Rebels gain territory", "Riots/Protests", and "Violence against civilians".
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Fighting (Tribe, County): Taking the Acled (2011) dataset, we have generated with the help of
ArcGIS the number of violent events per county and tribe (Q79). In particular, this variable varies on
the county and tribe level, and corresponds to the total amount of all violent events in a county and
linked to a given tribe taking place between the last day of the Afrobarometer 2000 survey (on June 26,
2000) and the rst day of the Afrobarometer 2008 survey (on July 27, 2008). It corresponds to the sum
of the events of the following "Event Type": "Battle-Government regains territory", "Battle-No change
of territory", "Battle-Rebels gain territory", "Riots/Protests", and "Violence against civilians".
Additional individual level controls (not reported in the main Tables):
Age: Continuous variable that varies on the individual level. Answer to the question "How old
are you?" (question Q1) of the Afrobarometer 2008.
Education: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. Takes a value of 1 if the respon-
dent indicates at least an education level of 4 in the question Q89 of the Afrobarometer 2008.
Employed: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. From Afrobarometer 2008. It
takes a value of 1 if "yes" (answer categories 2,3,4, and 5) is answered to the question "Do you have
a job that pays a cash income?" (question Q94).
Gender: Variable that varies on the individual level. 1=Male, 2=Female. From question Q101 of
the Afrobarometer 2008.
Rural: Variable that varies on the individual level. 1=Urban, 2=Rural. From question URBRUR
of the Afrobarometer 2008.
Own TV: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. From Afrobarometer 2008. It takes
a value of 1 if "Yes (Do own)" is answered to the question "Which of these things do you personally
own: Television?" (question Q92B).
Own Radio: Dummy variable that varies on the individual level. From Afrobarometer 2008.
It takes a value of 1 if "Yes (Do own)" is answered to the question "Which of these things do you
personally own: Radio?" (question Q92A).
Additional district/county level controls (not reported in the main Tables):
Population: Total population in district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of
Statistics, 2002).
Urban: Urbanization rate in district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of Statis-
tics, 2002).
Demographic Structure: Age dependency ratio in district in 2002. From the Census 2002
(Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Ethnic Fractionalization: This is a continuous county level variable that varies between 0 and
1. Using the Geo-Referenced Ethnic Group (GREG) dataset (Weidmann, Rød and Cederman, 2010),
we obtain with the help of ArcGIS the percentage of the area of a given county that is occupied
by a given ethnic group. For each county fractionalization is computed using the following formula:
FRAC =
nP
i=1
sharei  (1  sharei).
Share of Manufacture: Percentage of working population that are in the manufacturing sector
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in a given district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Share of Subsistence Farming: Percentage of working population that are in subsistence farm-
ing in a given district in 2002. From the Census 2002 (Ugandan Bureau of Statistics, 2002).
Ethnic (Tribe) FE: From variable Q79 ("What is your tribe? You know, your ethnic or cultural
group.") of Afrobarometer 2008.
Variables used in Section 5
Now we shall list the additional variables included in the empirical analysis of Section ??. Note that
when a variable is not listed this means that the variable denition detailed above applies. Further,
notice that for the living conditions regressions all variables are used on the individual level, while for
the satellite light regressions they are aggregated at the county level.
Living conditions (in 2008): This is a dummy variable varying on the individual level and taking
a value of 1 if "Neither good nor bad", "Fairly good", or "Very good" is answered to the question "In
general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions?" from the Afrobarometer 2008
(question Q4B).
Living conditions (in 2000): This is a continuous district level variable that gives the percentage
of respondents in a given district who answer "Somewhat satised" or "Very satised" to the question
"How satised are you with: A. Your own living conditions today?" from the Afrobarometer 2000
(question Q8A).
Satellite nightlight (in 2000 and 2008): The data comes from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (2010). We use their data on Average Visible, Stable Lights, & Cloud
Free Coverages of their satellite F15/F16. In particular, we use their "cleaned" and "ltered" version
of the data, which "contains the lights from cities, towns, and other sites with persistent lighting,
including gas ares. Ephemeral events, such as res have been discarded. Then the background noise
was identied and replaced with values of zero. Data values range from 1-63." Using ArcGIS we
generate the county level average nightlight intensity.
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